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Abstract: »Sozialer Kontext von Teamformierung: Warum verläuft die Formierung 
der Gründungsteams in unabhängigen Start-Ups und universitären Spin-Offs 
unterschiedlich?«. Although the entrepreneurial team has gained increasing at-
tention as a unit of analysis, we still do not understand much about how these 
teams form. Previous research has focused either on existing social relation-
ships and their role in the search for potential team members or on criteria for 
selecting team members. Consequently, we do not yet understand the interplay 
of search and selection. Another long-neglected aspect that is being increas-
ingly recognized in entrepreneurship research is that the entrepreneurial pro-
cess is influenced by its social context beyond existing social relationships. This 
social context is another important factor that has to be considered to properly 
understand team formation. To analyze how specific characteristics of one par-
ticularly relevant social context – namely, the entrepreneurial field – impact 
the search for and selection of team members, I conducted a qualitative, multi-
ple-case study that compares innovative new ventures in Berlin. The study 
shows that different types of ventures in different phases exhibit different 
team formation patterns based on their different and changing social contexts. 
From these patterns, I have derived different team-formation mechanisms and 
propositions about the conditions under which they apply. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurial teams, team formation, qualitative research, social 
context. 
1.   Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is increasingly conceptualized as a team effort; the image of 
the heroic individual entrepreneur is slowly being deconstructed. It is not only 
the solitary genius tinkering in his garage or the single, heroic entrepreneur 
who creates an astonishing business all by himself but instead, in most cases, a 
social group that is composed of diverse individuals or organizations. Team 
entrepreneurship not only goes against the grain of mainstream research but 
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also questions the deeply held culture of individualism in the Western world 
and the portrayal of the entrepreneur as the heroic person creating all from 
nothing on his own (Cooney 2005).  
More recently, however, the team has been receiving increasing attention as 
a unit of analysis in research on entrepreneurship (Stamm, Discua Cruz, and 
Cailluet 2019). The majority of these studies have been devoted to analyzing 
the impact of team characteristics on venture success. Yet to gain a comprehen-
sive understanding of team composition, team dynamics, and their impact on 
venture success, we have to understand how teams form. The few studies that 
have addressed the issue of team formation have either considered the search 
for team members, emphasizing the role of strong social relationships (Ruef, 
Aldrich and Carter 2003), or the selection criteria. The few earlier studies that 
do exist focused either on economic, need-based explanations, conceptualizing 
the addition of team members as a rational process of adding necessary compe-
tences (Ucbasaran et al. 2003), or on social factors such as homophily and 
interpersonal attraction (Ruef 2010; Francis and Sandberg 2000). What is miss-
ing so far is a systematic analysis of the interplay between search and selection.  
Aside from the growing recognition of the necessity to analyze entrepre-
neurial teams instead of single entrepreneurs (Harper 2008), there are also 
increasing voices calling for the need to include the impact of the context of 
entrepreneurship in entrepreneurship research in general (Welter 2011); the 
latter being long neglected in research on entrepreneurial team formation. One 
exception to this is the conceptual paper by Aldrich and Kim (2007), but empir-
ical validation is missing. If the context impacts the entrepreneurial process, we 
can also expect it to impact team formation as one of its elements. I argue that a 
profound understanding of the conditions under which specific mechanisms of 
team formation apply contributes to a more differentiated analysis of team 
formation in diverse contexts, increases comparability across studies, and 
avoids the risk of over-generalization.  
In this paper, I compare team formation of independent start-ups and univer-
sity spin-offs in Berlin to show how different social contexts influence team 
formation. In that region, one characteristic stands out: start-ups and spin-offs 
constitute distinct subfields despite being located in the same region. Independ-
ent start-ups and university spin-offs embed themselves in different subfields 
and these different social contexts influence team formation in both types of 
new ventures. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In the research that has paid attention to the entrepreneurial team as a unit of 
analysis, the dominant question has essentially been Which team characteris-
tics make a team successful? (Klotz et al. 2014). Most studies operate on the 
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assumption that the characteristics and capabilities of the founding team impact 
the new venture’s performance (Jin et al. 2017). Teams are expected to be 
especially successful when they aggregate human capital such as education, 
experience, knowledge, and skills, and many studies focused on the cognitive 
characteristics of the team members (de Mol, Khapova, and Elfring 2015). 
2.1  Previous Research on Team Formation 
Besides this focus on the factors influencing team performance, a minor part of 
entrepreneurship research has begun to direct attention to team formation. 
Recent studies have conceptualized team formation as a process in which 
members can join and leave the team (Cooney 2005; Vanaelst et al. 2006; 
Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Two major research interests can be identified, that I 
will outline in more detail below: first, how entrepreneurs search for team 
members, which they primarily do via their personal networks (Ruef, Aldrich, 
and Carter 2003), and second, how they select team members. Here, we can 
identify two dominant explanations: (a) economic requirements lead to adding 
team members with complementary skills (Ucbasaran et al. 2003) and (b) indi-
viduals are chosen who are similar to the existing team (Ruef 2010).  
First, the search for team members primarily takes place on the basis of in-
terpersonal relationships and in social networks. Such networks are the most 
common source for business partners (Ensley et al. 1999) and, consequently, 
teams are often comprised of spouses, friends, or loose acquaintances, all of 
whom are embedded in the same social circle (Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter 2003). 
In their conceptual framework, Aldrich and Kim (2007) argue that this applies 
if the entrepreneur is embedded in a “disconnected local cluster” (p. 157), as is 
typically the case for family businesses. In contrast, individuals are expected to 
use bridging ties and brokers for a need-based search to find more suitable, but 
also more distant, team members in social contexts with a more centralized 
network structure that enables them to access more distant clusters.  
Second, the selection of new members is (a) conceptualized as a rational 
process driven by economic, need-based considerations, mostly referred to as 
economic or instrumental explanations. Adding new team members with com-
plementary skills increases team capacities, thus filling skills gaps and provid-
ing human capital (Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Forbes et al. (2006) criticize this 
idea and show that adding new team members does not simply add to a team’s 
capacities but changes them as well. This may also lead to unintended effects 
and reduce human capital; for example, if the new team member causes con-
flicts in the team. Team formation is not only based on strategic, goal-oriented 
choices but (b) relies highly on familiarity and homophily (Ruef, Aldrich, and 
Carter 2003), mostly referred to as social explanations. According to relational 
demography, individuals choose those team members that are similar to them 
in terms of age, gender, or their ethnic group. Thus, teams are often composed 
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of family members, friends, or spouses, often from the same ethnic community 
and all of a similar age (Ruef 2010). Although most studies focus on either 
economic or social explanations, both are not mutually exclusive (Forbes et al. 
2006; Aldrich, and Kim 2007). Yet we know little about the interplay of eco-
nomic and social factors in team member search and selection.  
Both strands fail to systematically capture the impact of context factors oth-
er than social relationships. In contrast, the broader strand of entrepreneurship 
research, which focusses on other aspects of the entrepreneurial process than 
team formation, has contributed relevant insights by increasingly emphasizing 
the contextual impact on new venture creation (Welter 2011; Jack and Ander-
son 2002). Although this factor has rarely been addressed in team research so 
far, I expect the context to also influence team formation and incorporate the 
findings from this broader research stream into the analysis of team formation. 
Until now we have lacked a precise conceptualization of context. Context 
mostly describes either the entire environment of the start-up (Keating and 
McLoughlin 2010) or one specific part of it, such as the industry (Shaw, Wil-
son, and Pret 2017), region (Feldman 2001; Saxenian 1996), network structure 
(Ferrary and Granovetter 2009), or a cluster (Boari, Elfring, and Molina-
Morales 2016). This calls for an empirical investigation: Which contexts and 
which elements and characteristics of these contexts are relevant to team for-
mation? I take up the call to consider the context of entrepreneurship and em-
phasize the necessity to specify the relevant contexts, and elements of these 
contexts, that influence each part of the entrepreneurial process. 
The rather isolated discourse on university spin-offs can serve as starting 
point for an attempt to differentiate types of new ventures and their specific 
contexts. By focusing on the creation of a new venture in a specific context, we 
can consider its influence on team formation. Some studies have taken a closer 
look at team formation. Vanaelst et al. (2006) emphasized the importance to 
capture the process of team formation since there is a lot of change especially 
during the early founding stages. Unexpectedly, the cognitive heterogeneity 
decreases in this process, which supports the homophily argument. During the 
early stages, the “privileged witness,” a coach or consultant who serves in an 
advisory function, is a central part of the team. This role is mostly occupied by 
an individual from the university’s technology transfer office (TTO) or another 
actor from the mother organization. In many cases, once the product has 
reached a more mature state, a “surrogate entrepreneur,” an outsider with 
commercial expertise, is added, often initiated by the TTO (Franklin, Wright, 
and Lockett 2001). The entrepreneurial teams of university spin-offs have 
characteristic features since they mostly consist of scientists who want to 
commercialize their research. As scientists frequently lack managerial skills, a 
CEO from the outside is often added to the team, but only rarely contributes to 
the venture’s success in the intended way (Clarysse and Moray 2004). These 
roles and the conflicts that they entail can occur in the founding process of 
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many spin-offs but are often not found in other types of new-venture teams. 
This points to the necessity of identifying and discussing the peculiarities of 
different types of ventures. As Vanaelst et al. (2006) propose, a comparison 
with non-academic innovative ventures would be very insightful.  
Although this growing body of research offers important insights into how 
teams form and evolve, there remain several blank spots and shortcomings. 
Problems arise especially when it comes to conceptual clarity. A number of 
entrepreneurial team researchers have called attention to the fact that the con-
cept of entrepreneurial team is not yet well defined (Cooney 2005; Schjoedt 
and Kraus 2009; Vanaelst et al. 2006). This leads to incomparable research 
results since the unit of analysis may differ significantly. The most common 
aspect of the definition is that the entrepreneurial team comprises two or more 
individuals who jointly establish a firm. To narrow it down, authors have added 
several other criteria to the definition, for example, financial involvement 
(Kamm et al. 1990) or influence on strategic choices (Ensley et al. 1999). The 
unit of analysis may comprise idea-conceiving founders and equity-based in-
vestors (Lim, Busenitz, and Chidambaram 2013) or the technology transfer 
office and the parent organization (Vanaelst et al. 2006).  
Although previous research offers several insights into the criteria applied in 
searching and selecting team members, we still know little about the actual 
process of team formation and what triggers the search for new team members 
in the first place. Since the entrepreneurial process is characterized by high 
uncertainty and goal ambiguity, the notion of a rational actor engaged in a 
purely goal-oriented, strategic team formation process is unrealistic (Engel, 
Kaandorp, and Elfring 2017).  
Contradictory findings from different empirical settings indicate that team 
formation might proceed in different ways in different contexts. Vyakarnam, 
Jacobs, and Handelberg (1999) compared nine teams, comprising diverse fami-
ly businesses, start-ups, and spin-offs, and found very different kinds of team 
formation. Vanaelst et al. (2006) focused on spin-offs and found patterns across 
several spin-offs and founding stages. I argue that a deeper understanding of 
the contextual impact contributes to a better understanding of team formation 
and composition, increases the comparability of research results, avoids the risk 
of over-generalization, and helps to resolve contradictions in previous research. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
The goal of my paper is to analyze how different elements of contexts impact 
team formation without neglecting the influential factors identified by previous 
research. Developing a conceptual framework requires a precise definition of 
team. With a view to the increasing research on entrepreneurial teams, the 
divergent definitions, and to the evolving concept of entrepreneurial groups 
(Ruef 2010), I propose narrowing down the definition of team and differentiat-
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ing between team and group. In so doing, I follow Schjoedt and Kraus (2009), 
who argue that teams are a special kind of group in which members are more 
closely connected than in a group: 
An entrepreneurial team consists of two or more persons who have an interest, 
both financial and otherwise, in and commitment to a venture’s future and 
success; whose work is interdependent in the pursuit of common goals and 
venture success; who are accountable to the entrepreneurial team and for the 
venture; who are considered to be at the executive level with executive re-
sponsibility in the early phases of the venture, including founding and pre-
start up; and who are seen as a social entity by themselves and by others. 
(Schjoedt and Kraus 2009, 515)  
Drawing on this definition, I emphasize the aspect of self-perception and con-
ceptualize teams as a special type of social group that perceives itself, and is 
perceived by others, as the founding team of a new venture, without neglecting 
other aspects such as executive responsibility. Thus, in most cases, the team 
comprises two, three, or four entrepreneurs who are strongly and collectively 
involved in the founding process (e.g., the chief operating officer [CEO] and 
chief technology officer [CTO]). 
Like the entire entrepreneurial process, the process of team formation is also 
influenced by the context it takes place in. Aldrich and Yang’s (2013) question, 
How do entrepreneurs know what to do? can be applied to team formation as 
well: How do entrepreneurs know how to form a team and what that team 
should look like? The respective social context provides abstract cultural codes 
and incomplete blueprints. Entrepreneurs learn routines, habits, and heuristics 
that enable them to make use of these blueprints (Aldrich and Yang 2013). 
Such learning takes place in the respective environment; templates and norms 
are communicated through interactions, for example, in the family context, 
education and training, and work careers (Aldrich and Yang 2012). Since we 
lack research on what contexts and what characteristics of these contexts have 
an impact, I will seek to fill this gap by empirically analyzing the features of 
the contexts that impact team formation.  
To capture the relevant organizational environment, I apply the concept of 
organizational fields from institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Scott 1995). Although institutional theory has increasingly emphasized hetero-
geneity and the active making of institutions over the past decades (Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence, Zilber, and Leca 2013), my emphasis will be on 
the idea of homogeneity and isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Without neglecting that there are differences between teams 
and team formation processes, focusing on their similarities tells us a lot about 
the mechanisms of team formation that apply across new ventures of different 
kinds (Meyer and Höllerer 2014). The concept of organizational fields empha-
sizes the isomorphism of organizations in a single field and highlights that the 
dominant practices may not necessarily be the most efficient ones but may be 
the most legitimate choice (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Fields can center 
HSR 44 (2019) 4  │  48 
around a common issue and become arenas in which the meaning of this issue 
is negotiated (Hoffman 1999; Meyer and Höllerer 2010). In my analysis, the 
relevant field centers around entrepreneurship and is regionally bound to Ber-
lin. 
In light of previous research, I expect social relationships, relevant external 
actors (such as the TTO), and blueprints to be relevant contextual influences. 
Furthermore, a search for team members might be triggered by the need for 
complementary competences and the selection of team members influenced by 
economic needs or homophily and familiarity. In interaction with their social 
contexts, such as friends and family, but also with relevant organizations, en-
trepreneurs learn routines, habits, and heuristics that affect how they search and 
select team members. My goal is to specify the impact of specific contextual 
factors and elaborate the interplay of search procedures and selection criteria as 
well as of social and economic factors. 
3. Methods 
The analyzed data is part of a more comprehensive data set collected for a 
research project that compares the founding processes of independent start-ups 
and university spin-offs in Berlin. Since team formation is a crucial part of the 
founding process, this data is suitable for the analysis pursued here.  
3.1  Research Design 
Since previous research suggests that the social context might impact team 
formation, I followed a multiple-case study design (Yin 1994) to compare team 
formation across several new ventures in two different social contexts. In 
particular, team formation in spin-offs has already been analyzed in qualitative 
studies with one (Clarysse and Moray 2004) to ten cases (Vanaelst et al. 2006). 
I will build on and go beyond these studies to identify patterns across cases. 
Multiple cases are a powerful means of theory building because they permit 
replication and extension beyond individual cases (Eisenhardt 1991). 
Considering multiple cases increases generalizability, ensures that the 
identified processes are not wholly idiosyncratic, and enables the researcher to 
identify the specific conditions under which the detected mechanisms apply 
(Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2014), which is the objective of this research. 
To analyze patterns of team formation and the influences that shape them, I 
compared two types of new ventures that vary along relevant dimensions: start-
ups (i.e., innovative independent growth companies) and university spin-offs 
(i.e., innovative growth companies that started at a university or research 
institute, often commercializing intellectual property developed in research 
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projects). For each type of new venture, several cases were selected in a 
process of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
3.2  Data Collection 
The total data set comprises 54 semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs 
and related actors that lasted approximately one hour on average, fieldnotes 
from participant observation of 17 start-up and spin-off events, and information 
collected from websites and media. I conducted 29 interviews with 
entrepreneurs from 19 start-ups and 16 interviews with entrepreneurs from 14 
university spin-offs. To mitigate retrospective bias, I chose recently established 
ventures. Most new ventures were in their early founding stages and between 
half a year and two years old. In four cases, two or three founders were 
interviewed. In seven cases, the interviewees were interviewed again after one 
year to learn about the evolution of the founding process and changes in team 
formation. Out of this data set, I sampled those cases that were based in Berlin 
and founded by a team, hence excluding solo entrepreneurs. This led to a 
database comprising 39 interviews with individuals from 29 ventures
1
. To 
characterize the context, I used information from eight additional interviews 
with relevant actors, websites, and media
2
.  
3.3  Data Analysis 
The data analysis proceeded in five steps. (1) To prepare the data for analysis, I 
coded all information on team formation. This reduced the database to those 
parts of the interviews that focused on team formation. (2) Drawing on this 
data, I wrote a case description for each case so that its unique pattern could 
emerge before generalizing across cases (Eisenhardt 1989). (3) Subsequently, I 
analyzed the data using qualitative content analysis–not to be confused with 
quantitative content analysis. I developed a system of categories based on my 
conceptual framework (Gläser and Laudel 2009, 2013). To keep the advantage 
of qualitative research, namely, the opportunity to discover new and 
unexpected aspects in the data, the system of categories remained open so that 
new categories could be added during the coding process. While coding, text 
passages were not only marked, but the relevant information was also extracted 
from the data. These extracts laid the groundwork for step (4): searching for 
patterns in the team formation processes. To guard against the risk of finding 
what I was looking for (that is, identifying a strong contextual impact because 
of selecting cases according to this criterion), I opted for cross-case analysis 
                                                             
1  The personal perspective on team formation might impact the story told. To mitigate this 
effect, I interviewed team members with managerial roles and roles concerned with tech-
nology development at both types of new ventures. 
2  All entrepreneurs, new ventures, and other actors are anonymized in this paper. 
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(Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2014). That is, I sorted the extracts along 
recurring themes, not along cases, and clustered similar mechanisms of team 
formation. In this process, I identified major differences in relation to the 
founding background and confirmed the initial hypothesis that guided case 
selection. I then divided start-ups and spin-offs by referring to their founding 
background. (5) In the next step, I grouped the cases by that dimension and 
searched for within-group similarities and intergroup differences (Eisenhardt 
1989). In this process, three typical patterns for start-ups and two typical 
patterns for spin-offs emerged. To validate and differentiate these patterns, I 
chose select cases for a case-by-case comparison: (a) one typical example of 
each pattern (AIweb and PhysicsTech), (b) a spin-off with above average 
similarities to typical start-ups (InductInfustion and StyleShop), and (c) a spin-
off and a start-up with similar innovations (InductInfustion and 
SafetySolution). 
4. Findings 
My goal is to analyze typical mechanisms of team formation for independent 
start-ups and university spin-offs and the specific conditions under which they 
apply. These conditions primarily refer to contextual factors. First, I introduce 
the analytical differentiation of initial team formation and team enlargement, 
the two stages of team formation that I derived from my data. Second, I de-
scribe the entrepreneurial field in Berlin as the context of team formation in 
this study. Third, I compare the mechanisms of team formation using empirical 
examples, first for initial team formation, then for team enlargement. For each 
phase, I first outline the findings for start-ups, followed by the findings for 
spin-offs, concluded with a comparison of both types of new ventures in each 
phase. 
4.1  Initial Team Formation and Team Enlargement 
As previous research has shown, a team might evolve and its composition 
might change over time. My analysis identified two phases of team formation 
during the early founding stages. In the first phase, the initial team forms. It 
comprises those entrepreneurs who started to form a team. The second phase 
involves team enlargement in many cases. In some cases, the initial team and 
the added team members can merge into a team in which all members are on an 
equal footing; in other cases, the initial team members might dominate the 
team. Initial team formation and team enlargement are structured by different 
mechanisms. To capture these different mechanisms, I identified three different 
ways in which the relationships between team members are formed. First, if the 
team members did not know each other in advance, ties are created. If they 
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were connected via a weak social tie, this weak tie is transformed into a strong 
business tie (i.e., the new dimension outweighs the previous weak tie). If the 
team members had a strong social relationship prior to team formation, this 
strong social tie is layered with a strong business tie (i.e., the new dimension is 
added).  
4.2  The Entrepreneurial Field in Berlin 
Over the past years, Berlin has evolved into one of the leading start-up hotspots 
in Europe and provides a context for entrepreneurship with several peculiari-
ties. It is a metropolitan area with plenty of well-educated, often international 
young people, has four universities, and affordable cost of living. The founding 
rates of innovative new ventures have increased over the past decades. Most of 
the entrepreneurial activity, especially of innovative, independent start-ups, is 
locally clustered around two neighboring districts. The entrepreneurial field in 
Berlin is characterized by a partitioning into two subfields: start-ups and start-
up-related actors on the one hand and spin-offs and spin-off-related actors on 
the other. There is no sharp boundary between the two populations, but most 
entrepreneurs, new ventures, and other actors cluster around one of the two 
subfields. These two subfields represent contexts with different characteristics. 
In the start-up-related subfield, the entrepreneurial community plays a cru-
cial role. This is a community of entrepreneurs and other individuals who are 
somehow involved in entrepreneurship, such as angel investors (i.e., individu-
als who invest their private money during the early founding stages). This 
community shares an identity and understanding of entrepreneurship. Here, we 
find vivid informal exchange and plenty of personal relationships of varying 
degrees of proximity between nascent entrepreneurs, established entrepreneurs, 
serial entrepreneurs, angel investors, and advisors. Venture capitalists (VCs) 
play a key role and become increasingly important as the start-up grows. Fur-
ther organizational actors are part of the field, for instance, accelerators (i.e., 
start-up programs, often launched by established companies, to promote start-
up growth), company builders, or co-working spaces. 
The founders of spin-offs are mostly scientists who want to commercialize 
their findings. Prior to founding their spin-offs, they are members of their re-
spective scientific community and have to change to the entrepreneurial field to 
found their venture. Mostly, the basic idea for a product was already there; they 
transfer intellectual property (IP) developed at the university. The nascent 
entrepreneurs need funding to elaborate their idea and build a prototype. To 
appropriate such funding, they almost always apply for a public funding pro-
gram called Exist. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
launched this funding program to support university spin-offs. It comprises two 
funding lines: Exist Forschungstransfer (Exist FT) and Exist Gründerstipendi-
um (Exist GS). Exist FT focuses on the commercialization of IP and finances 
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teams of up to four entrepreneurs; Exist GS funds innovations that do not rely 
on IP and gives scholarships to teams of up to three entrepreneurs. Both pro-
grams have formal requirements concerning team composition. As the team 
and venture evolve, they embed themselves in one of the two sub-fields of the 
entrepreneurial field, namely the one that is dominated by public and semi-
public actors. Once Exist funding expires, follow-up financing is mostly ac-
quired from public or semi-public investors, such as a regional bank or the 
High-Tech Gründerfonds (HTGF), a public-private partnership that invests 
venture capital. 
In addition to their specific entrepreneurial field, start-ups and spin-offs are 
also embedded in the respective industry of their product. Since this embed-
ment did not show any noteworthy impact on team formation in the present 
study, the analysis focused on the entrepreneurial field and the nascent entre-
preneurs’ membership in the entrepreneurial or respective scientific communi-
ty, which did prove to have an impact. The differences in the subfields in which 
the nascent entrepreneurs and the new ventures of start-ups and university spin-
offs are embedded shape the team formation process in distinct ways. The 
argument that I want to make here is that different influences dominate the two 
different stages of team formation–initial team formation and team enlarge-
ment. In the following, I will compare the patterns of team formation of start-
ups and spin-offs in each stage. Table 1 and 2 provide an overview across 
selected cases. 
 
  
Table 1: Team Formation of Selected Start-Ups 
 
   
Table 2: Team Formation of Selected Spin 
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Strong social relationships play a key role in initial team formation. Friendships 
are the dominant way to find a co-founder; familiarity and personal attraction 
are the dominant selection criteria. However, not all friends qualify as potential 
team members: the only relevant friends are those that are also members of 
either the entrepreneurial community (start-ups) or a specific scientific com-
munity (spin-offs). Searching in these specific contexts ensures that the friend 
and prospective team member has certain competences. 
Strong social relationships are especially crucial for the constitution of the 
initial team of a start-up, which usually comprises two founders who have 
known each other for several years. Often, the two initial founders were best 
friends since school or university, or at least loose acquaintances that, for ex-
ample, played poker together for several years. Typically, both nascent entre-
preneurs are members of the entrepreneurial community, even before starting 
the current start-up. Thus, not all social relationships of these entrepreneurs are 
relevant to initial team formation; instead, only those that are part of the entre-
preneurial community. I identified three patterns and, for all three, the entre-
preneurial community is crucial. 
(1) For this pattern, a pre-existing, close friendship between two nascent en-
trepreneurs is the basis for forming the initial team; particularly if the two 
founders studied together, resulting in similar competencies and a shared edu-
cation in management. The two entrepreneurs who initiated the founding of 
AIweb, Peter and Paul, studied together at a prestigious private business school 
several years before founding this start-up together and have been best friends 
ever since; an example of this friendship being that Peter is the godfather of 
Paul’s daughter. After his studies, Peter founded two start-ups in a row: one of 
them failed; the other was sold successfully. Paul founded one successful com-
pany and , after a time, became bored of it. Peter, meanwhile, had no project 
after he sold his company, and so they decided to found a start-up together. 
Thus, the initial team was established through a long lasting, intense friendship 
and the wish to found a business together. Their next step was to search for an 
idea:  
We were best friends and said to each other: we have to found something to-
gether! […] So, we met in a fancy café, sat together, and asked ourselves: 
Jeez, what are we going to do? We talked about several ideas, evaluated mar-
kets, and searched for potential. (Paul, AIweb) 
The main driver to form the initial team was their desire to found a venture 
with that one specific person, not a market opportunity or innovative idea. The 
latter was conceived in the second step. The basis of team formation was exist-
ing strong social relationships that were often constituted outside the entrepre-
neurial community but are now part of it. When the team member chosen is 
your best friend, the search process turns on the selection criteria of personal 
attraction, sympathy, and familiarity.  
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 (2) In three cases, the founders were loose acquaintances. These contacts 
were often established in the entrepreneurial community. The founders of Fi-
nanceAssist met as participants in an accelerator program in which Enno par-
ticipated with his previous start-up and Chris was his mentor. After Enno’s first 
start-up failed, they decided to found the next one together. In this case, the 
need for a co-founder played a greater role, but the fact that Enno pursued his 
search for a co-founder among acquaintances and buddies in the entrepreneuri-
al community indicates that ensuring personal fit and sympathy remains an 
important factor. The founders of RateYourDrink were also loose friends and 
formed a team driven by an opportunity: 
I recognized that I can’t continue with my first programmer. And then, I sat in 
my backyard together with Roy, and we talked a bit. I talked about that prob-
lem, and Gino said: ‘That sounds interesting! I’m in!’ Okay, so he joined the 
team. Spontaneously and uncomplicated. (Aldo, RateYourDrink) 
(3) In two cases, the two founders did not know each other before they founded 
the start-up and had just met at start-up events. Each of them was already a 
member of the entrepreneurial community, and being part of this community is 
what brought them together, making this part of the entrepreneurial field espe-
cially significant for their initial team formation. Adrian already had the idea 
for Connector, met his co-founder Nigel at a start-up event, and pitched his 
idea to Nigel at that event. Nigel pitched another idea, but both identified po-
tential in combining their prototypes: 
We met at [an event of an entrepreneurial network]. Nigel pitched his idea to 
create a web platform, and I pitched my idea to found a start-up that matches 
[couples]. And after that, we talked, ‘Hey Nigel, what do you say? Can’t we 
combine your technology and my idea?’ (Adrian, Connector) 
Now, I will have a closer look at the initial team formation of spin-offs. In all 
analyzed spin-off cases, the formation of the initial team started with a product 
idea or market opportunity in the respective scientific community. Neither the 
entrepreneurial community nor the entrepreneurial field played a role. Nascent 
entrepreneurs are members of their respective scientific community. Yet 
friendships and less intense social relationships were still the dominant chan-
nels used to search for initial team members. Two patterns of initial team for-
mation could be identified: (1) if the founder was able to find a friend or ac-
quaintance in his or her scientific community with whom to found the 
envisioned business, they formed the initial team. (2) A lead entrepreneur 
wanted to commercialize his or her findings and started to search for team 
members among his or her existing social relationships in diverse contexts. 
(1) It is typical of this pattern that researchers know other researchers be-
cause they studied together or worked together in a research project or labora-
tory and developed a friendship. Thus, they are not only connected by their 
friendship but often by joint work experience as well. The technology then is 
the initiating factor. Two or three acquainted scientists come together, talk 
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about their work, and eventually think about ways to commercialize their find-
ings. The team forms around the idea and the motivation to exploit it commer-
cially.  
We, being the scientists that we are, […] are of course very enthusiastic about 
the technology we developed, no matter if it really helps anyone or ultimately 
has any commercial potential. (Sven, PhysicsTech) 
ManageEnergy is an extreme case in point that illustrates this pattern. The 
spinning out of ManageEnergy was part of a research project. The obvious 
choice was to select suitable team members from the project to work on rolling 
out the product. The possible pool of candidates was thus limited to the re-
searchers that were part of this research project. The project led three engineers 
to cross paths; they eventually became friends and jointly tackled the task. 
(2) In the second pattern, a single lead entrepreneur dominates the initial 
team formation process. In the cases that fit this pattern, friendship relation-
ships are either missing altogether or the relationships are just loose acquaint-
ances from work. One researcher wants to commercialize his or her findings 
and searches for team members. This search starts in the researcher’s personal 
scientific network, mostly at his or her research institute or laboratory, but may 
also extend to the person’s wider private network. Since the idea is often based 
on the findings from this researcher’s PhD thesis, that individual is likely to 
dominate the spin-off’s team formation process. The founder of AdverdApp 
explained this when asked who participated in the founding process: “That was 
my idea. I am the founder” (Torsten, AdverdApp).  
YourFertilizer started with a totally different team when they applied for 
public funding. The lead entrepreneur had to assemble an entirely new team 
afterwards. When the founder of AnalyseAll wanted to commercialize his 
findings, he first went to his co-worker who was also just finishing his PhD: 
Me and the other PhD student sat in one office together, so we shared four 
years of painful experience. This built a huge foundation of trust and showed 
that we can work together. (Rudi, AnalyseAll) 
Together, they started to form a four-person team. The first team member is 
often recruited through work (i.e., doing similar research and being members of 
the same scientific community), sometimes involving a loose friendship or 
acquaintanceship. The founder tends to consider this initial team as being very 
important and thus looks for a team member that s/he is likely able to work 
with. Searching at the same research institute ensures the scientific fit of that 
team member. The decision as to which person is to be recruited from this 
setting is guided by personal sympathy and a similar work style. 
A comparing of initial team formation in both types of new ventures illus-
trates the importance of existing social relationships in the search for initial 
team members, as Figure 1 illustrates. Personal attraction, familiarity, and 
sympathy are the dominant criteria in selecting these initial members. In most 
of the analyzed cases, this search took place in the community of which the 
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nascent entrepreneurs were members. The competences of the prospective team 
member moved to the background. The founder could afford to neglect this 
aspect because it is implicitly taken care of by choosing to search in the respec-
tive community where all potential candidates can be assumed to have these 
skills. Differences can be detected depending on the strength of the existing 
ties. In the case of strong social relationships, such as close friendships, another 
layer was added: the founders continued their close friendship and additionally 
became business partners. In weak social relationships, such as acquaintances, 
these were transformed into strong business relationships: the founders had a 
looser connection and now became close business partners. This new dimen-
sion came to dominate and thus transformed their previous relationship.  
Proposition 1A: Initial teams are predominantly formed inside the commu-
nity of which the nascent entrepreneur is a member. The rest of the entrepre-
neurial field is less important in this stage. Familiarity and sympathy outweigh 
competences and instrumental needs as selection criteria. 
Proposition 1B: If a technological idea precedes team formation, the team 
formation process is more likely to be led by a lead entrepreneur. This person’s 
search for team members might span a wider net of relationships in more di-
verse social circles.  
The entrepreneurial community has less specific entry requirements, also in 
terms of verified expertise, than the scientific community. It is thus more likely 
that close friends are both members of the entrepreneurial community. Specific 
scientific communities are more difficult to enter, highly elaborated, and re-
quire specialized skills. Furthermore, the product idea of spin-offs usually 
already exists which entails the need for more specific skills right from the 
beginning. These conditions impose demands on prospective team members 
that are more difficult to fulfill. Consequently, although social relationships and 
interpersonal fit are still highly important, it is more difficult to find a suitable 
team member inside that specific context. This being the case, initial team 
formation by building strong business ties on strong social ties can be expected 
to be more likely for start-ups than for spin-offs, and spin-off entrepreneurs can 
be expected to be more likely to transform weak social ties into strong business 
ties or to extend their search to other social contexts. Before a scientist and 
would-be entrepreneur searches for co-founders among members of the scien-
tific community who are unknown to him/her, s/he will prefer searching for 
people whom s/he is familiar with in broader social contexts.  
Proposition 2: The more specialized and difficult it is to enter the nascent 
entrepreneur’s community, the less likely it is that the entrepreneur will find 
suitable team members in that community with which he or she has a strong 
social relationship. This also tends to make it more likely that the entrepreneur 
will extend the search either to relationships based on weak social ties or to his 
or her wider network of social contacts in various social circles. 
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Figure 1: Pattern of Initial Team Formation  
 
4.4 Team Enlargement: Instrumental Needs and the Impact of 
Blueprints and Rules 
The fact that the formation of the initial team is predominantly based on close 
friendships or other social relationships, a good personal fit between the found-
ers, and their mutual membership in the entrepreneurial or respective scientific 
community tends to result in teams consisting of individuals with homogeneous 
competences. A result is that the initial teams of start-ups often feature a pre-
ponderance of managerial skills, whereas the initial teams of spin-offs are 
heavy on skills in the area of technology development. In the team enlargement 
phase, complementary competences are added. However, this does not lead to 
an alignment of team characteristics between the new venture types. In the 
following, I will first outline how the initial teams searched for additional team 
members, as illustrated in Figure 2. Second, I will show why they started this 
search. Often, it was a response to external expectations or formal requirements 
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from other organizations in the entrepreneurial field, so that economic, needs-
based explanations alone fail to capture the full picture. 
4.4.1  Searching for Missing Competences 
In the start-up cases in which the initial team already comprised all competenc-
es deemed necessary, no further team members were added. In those cases in 
which the initial founders knew each other from school or other social settings, 
they often had complementary skills and did not add any further team members 
(Pattern 2). The variety of skills among the initial team affected whether anoth-
er person was added and, if so, what skills that person had, as shown in Table 
1. In the other cases, the initial team strategically searched to fill missing com-
petences (Pattern 1 and 3). This search was primarily conducted within the 
personal networks of the founders in the entrepreneurial community. The main 
driver for team formation shifted from the interest in founding a venture to the 
addition of needed competences without neglecting the necessary personal fit 
and sympathy between the team members. Searching within the personal net-
work increases the probability of finding someone personally suitable (Pattern 
1). If the initial team comprised two founders with a background in manage-
ment, they added a programmer to become the CTO. To find this programmer, 
the founders often turned to their broader personal network in the entrepreneur-
ial community:  
We found our CTO through our network. We mailed several people and said, 
‘We’ve founded a start-up and we need a CTO. Do you know somebody?’ 
(Michael, StyleShop) 
In these cases, the initial team was a very tightly connected unit that was more 
stable than the rest of the team, while the CTO was interchangeable. When the 
founder of WebService talks about the founding process, he mostly uses “we,” 
which includes himself and his initial co-founder, and when referring to the 
CTO, he speaks of “he” or “our CTO.” In the two cases in which the initial 
team formed via tie creation, the third team member was also added via tie 
creation (Pattern 3). 
Whereas only about half of the start-up cases under study added one team 
member, nearly all analyzed spin-offs supplemented missing competences 
during the process of team enlargement, as Table 2 shows. In most of these 
cases, managerial competence was missing, but sometimes they also needed 
specific skills for product development, as the founder of InnoEngine ex-
plained,  
We developed our prototype until we got stuck. So, we figured, okay, we can’t 
go on with just the two of us; we need someone who really knows how to con-
struct that kind of stuff. (Clara, InnoEngine) 
Since the initial team primarily consisted of scientists, they were lacking busi-
ness expertise. Five entrepreneurs among the interviewees articulated this as 
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being the main motivation to search for a business team member: “We added a 
third team member, simply to fill this competence gap” (Richard, InductInfu-
sion).  
In contrast to the initial teams of the start-ups, the initial teams of the spin-
offs searched their entire personal network for suitable team members, span-
ning all kinds of social circles such as neighbors, colleagues of the founder’s 
spouse, or sports mates. The founders of InductInfusion searched their whole 
social circle:  
We were thinking about who we know with managerial skills, scanned our en-
tire social environment if we know someone who could do it. And my co-
founder Eric plays tennis with Toni; they have known each other for several 
years. So, we figured, okay, we think Toni is doing something along the lines 
of management and so we asked him if he wants to join us. (Richard, In-
ductInfusion) 
If they did not find a suitable team member within their personal network, they 
used job ads. Although the search and selection process may have been influ-
enced by an intentional search for missing skills, in at least half of my cases it 
was in response to the formal requirements of an external actor. 
4.4.2 Triggering the Search for Missing Competences: Impact of 
Blueprints and Rules 
The previous chapter outlined how team members came together; let us now 
take a closer look at why. The entrepreneurs in this study did search for addi-
tional team members that filled certain needs, not only for the sole reason that 
they really needed these competences but also because they were expected to 
have them. The teams of each type of new venture look too similar and their 
products too different to claim that team formation was dominated by the nec-
essary skills required by the product. This begs the question: How do nascent 
entrepreneurs know whom they should add? They searched in their closer and 
broader personal network, but first they needed to have an idea of whom they 
were looking for. In the case of the start-ups, team enlargement was guided by 
the anticipated expectations of VCs, blueprints communicated in the entrepre-
neurial field, and learned customs. In the case of the spin-offs, the driver of 
team enlargement was formal requirements set by the public funding program 
Exist. 
Several initial teams of start-ups searched for a CTO among their personal 
networks. But why did they search for a CTO in the first place? This cannot be 
explained sufficiently by the need to add complementary competences. AIweb 
started to develop their technology with freelancers; later they employed a 
small developer team but did not add anyone from that team to the founding 
team (e.g., they did not let any of them be part of their inner circle and did not 
give them any decision-making power or shares). They intended to continue in 
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this constellation, but their potential investors expected them to name a CTO 
during their negotiations:  
We started to negotiate with investors and we figured, okay, now we need a 
CTO, because they want a CTO. So we were thinking, one, two, three, who 
should do it? Let’s take Tom. This is how Tom became the CTO. Very prag-
matic. (Paul, AIweb) 
This shows that founders anticipate the expectations of relevant external actors, 
in this case of VCs, and act accordingly. VCs are assumed to invest primarily 
in the team. This is strongly anticipated by entrepreneurs. They often point to 
the team as the most important factor for success, not only because trouble in 
the team impedes start-up success but also because it is easier to raise funding 
with the right team:  
Basically, if you want to raise money, the investors invest in the team, sec-
ondarily in the idea, predominantly in the team. They have to trust the team, 
that, even if the idea does not work one hundred per cent, the team is able to 
give it a different twist and find a way to still make some money in the mar-
ket. The founding team is the most important thing. (Daniel, WebService) 
He frequently emphasized that their CTO had designed the technology for two 
successful start-ups before and that this was a major criterion for adding him to 
the team because it signaled experience to potential investors. The founder of 
RateYourDrink points to the way-to-go aspect by calling it a “rule of thumb” 
that VCs apply and “the ideal” they expect:  
The general rule of thumb is, no VC invests in a lone warrior. The ideal is a 
group of three people with different competences, team completed. (Aldo, 
RateYourDrink)  
These perceptions resonate with the criteria that the interviewed angel investors 
mentioned. Although they also stressed the centrality of the team in evaluating 
the start-up, one of the angel investors explained that nowadays the competenc-
es that they expect the team to have are more strongly oriented toward the 
needs of the particular start-up. A few years ago, each team was expected to 
comprise the same roles and expertise. This highlights the normative aspect of 
the investors’ expectations. Founders not only construct anticipated expecta-
tions of this kind by interacting with VCs but also by interacting with other 
entrepreneurs. The notion that VCs invest in the team has evolved as a narrative 
that circulates in the entrepreneurial community – a narrative that functions as a 
blueprint of what a team should look like. By interacting with others in the 
entrepreneurial community and the field, entrepreneurs learn how to found a 
business and how to be an entrepreneur. The observed processes of team for-
mation are relatively homogeneous across all start-ups even though they vary 
in regard to several other characteristics, such as their product or the markets 
they address. This homogeneity in the process of team formation results from 
being educated in the same entrepreneurial community and field.  
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In contrast to the nascent entrepreneurs of start-ups, there is no prior entre-
preneurial education for the nascent entrepreneurs of spin-offs. As I argued 
above, in about half of the analyzed cases, the addition of further team mem-
bers was triggered by needs for complementary competences that were identi-
fied by the initial team. In the other cases, the team did not identify the need for 
managerial competence; instead, the search for a management person was 
triggered, and sometimes even forced, by the rules of the funding program. In 
these cases, the team formation process was strongly influenced by the formal 
requirements of the public funding programs Exist FT and Exist GS. These 
programs are the functional equivalent to the blueprints that reflect VCs‘ ex-
pectations of what a start-up team should look like. When asked how he joined 
the team, the ScieTech team member with business expertise explained: “It is a 
necessary condition of Exist FT to add managerial competence; scientists alone 
do not receive Exist funding” (Robert, ScieTech).  
In contrast to the anticipated expectations of VCs that influence start-up 
team formation, the expectations here are formal requirements of the public 
funding program. Here, there is no informal entrepreneurial education of those 
who enter the entrepreneurial community from science; in this environment, 
nascent entrepreneurs do not learn the customs or routines of entrepreneurial 
team formation. Some spin-offs retrospectively evaluated the addition of a 
team member with business skills as useful, but in one case it led to huge prob-
lems. The lead entrepreneur of YourFertilizer criticized this requirement as one 
of the biggest problems of Exist FT:  
We found our management guy via recommendations. But he was a total let-
down. That is the only thing I’m really criticizing about Exist FT: they force 
you to hire a business person. (Bert, YourFertilizer) 
This team member was accused of lowering the efficiency of the team, but they 
could not fire him until the funding ended. This underlines the strong impact of 
the formal requirements on team formation.  
Different mechanisms dominate during the different phases of team for-
mation at both types of new ventures. In both types of new ventures, the for-
mation of the initial team was predominantly based on friendship or acquaint-
anceship. For team enlargement, a need-oriented search and an orientation 
toward anticipated expectations of relevant external actors or their formal re-
quirements became important. Although both types of ventures eventually 
added complementary competences, the forms and compositions of the teams 
were not the same in this second phase. Figure 2 illustrates the different mech-
anisms of team enlargement. If the initial team was formed by a lead entrepre-
neur, not only the initial team but also the enlarged team featured a higher skill 
diversity. 
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Figure 2: Pattern of Team Enlargement 
 
Proposition 3: The search for initial team members via strong social ties in 
one specific community and the selection of team members on grounds of 
familiarity and sympathy leads to homogenous competences within the initial 
team. The process of team enlargement, by contrast, serves to add missing 
competences. Competences are missing because the mechanisms of initial team 
formation foster skill homogeneity. The competences of the prospective team 
member thus gain importance as a selection criterion in team enlargement. 
The products of start-ups and spin-offs require different skill sets and re-
sources. Since spin-offs commercialize innovative ideas that are developed 
through years of research, they need scientific competence in their team. In 
contrast, the products and business models of start-ups demand a stronger focus 
on managerial competence. This might partly explain the differences between 
start-ups and spin-offs but not the similarities within each type since the prod-
ucts vary significantly across the analyzed cases. To explain these similarities, 
the impact of the entrepreneurial field is central. Which organizations are rele-
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vant in the specific field and how they impact team formation differ. Different 
conditions lead to different mechanisms of team formation. 
Proposition 4A: Different contextual factors play a role during the two dif-
ferent stages of team formation. While initial team formation strongly relies on 
social relationships in the entrepreneurial or scientific community, other organ-
izations in the entrepreneurial field become more important in the process of 
team enlargement. 
Proposition 4B: Different (sub-)fields may rely on different blueprints in 
different ways. The more the blueprints force entrepreneurs to compose their 
team in certain ways, the higher the probability of conflict and team members 
exiting. 
Two cases show an untypical combination of patterns: the nascent entrepre-
neurs were previously embedded in the entrepreneurial community and applied 
for public funding via the Exist program (WebTech, CrossApp). In these cases, 
the formal requirements of the funding programs were creatively interpreted 
drawing on customs and following blueprints learned in the entrepreneurial 
community. As mentioned earlier, Exist GS requires three team members, one 
of whom has to have managerial competence. The four friends who had the 
idea for CrossApp decided to share one of the scholarships and hired two more 
people. In so doing, the official team of three fulfilled all formal requirements. 
By hiring their first employees early on, they signaled to private investors that 
they would be able to meet their expectations in regard to the speed of product 
development. This case underscores the impact of the blueprints provided and 
customs learned in the entrepreneurial community. The anticipated expecta-
tions of potential investors led the entrepreneurial team to make creative use of 
the public funding program’s formal requirements and mitigate their impact on 
team formation. 
In contrast to start-up entrepreneurs, spin-off entrepreneurs change contexts. 
They move from the scientific community to the entrepreneurial field and 
respective industry of their product, but in most cases, they do not become 
members of the entrepreneurial community. Consequently, they do not learn 
the common blueprints, habits, or routines from other entrepreneurs, neither 
before nor while forming a team. They have to solve the problem of how to 
form a team differently: for spin-off entrepreneurs, the formal rules of the 
public funding program serve as a functional equivalent to the blueprints of the 
entrepreneurial start-up community.  
Proposition 5: If an informal entrepreneurial education is missing, formal 
requirements have a greater impact on team formation. Prior informal entrepre-
neurial education enables entrepreneurs to interpret formal requirements crea-
tively. 
In contrast to the initial teams of the start-ups, all initial teams of the spin-
offs added further team members, as Tables 1 and 2 show. Specifically if initial 
team formation relied on layering strong business ties on strong social ties 
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within the respective scientific community, the entrepreneurs’ skill sets were 
very similar. Adding a business person usually became a must since the public 
funding program required a founder with business expertise. As the entrepre-
neurial community is characterized by greater skill diversity, the initial teams 
that form inside that community were more likely to comprise all required or 
expected skills. In contrast, it was far less likely to find team members with 
sufficiently diverse skills inside a specific scientific community. Thus, team 
enlargement was more common for spin-offs than for start-ups. For team en-
largement, interpersonal selection criteria lose importance. In this phase, trans-
forming weak social ties into strong business ties and tie creation become the 
dominant mechanisms. 
Proposition 6: A high homogeneity in competences among the members of 
a specific community decreases the likelihood of finding all necessary team 
members inside that community. Thus, the search for team members expands 
to wider nets of relationships, spanning diverse social contexts. 
There are more relevant actors in the entrepreneurial field that might impact 
the further founding process, but these are the relevant actors and contexts for 
team formation. This underscores the need to specify the relevant contexts for 
the individual processes and phases of team formation. A single actor – for 
instance, the public funding programs for spin-offs – can dominate the impact 
of the entrepreneurial field. For start-ups, the relevant factors are the blueprints 
provided and habits and routines learned in the entrepreneurial community 
along with the anticipated expectations of VCs. 
5.  Discussion 
Team formation of start-ups and spin-offs in Berlin takes place under different 
conditions. The mechanisms of team formation vary between the two but also 
show several similarities. In both types of new ventures, the team formation 
process starts with the formation of the initial team, which might be enlarged in 
a second step. Different mechanisms dominate the process during the different 
phases. 
This qualitative study makes two main contributions: (1) It has identified 
two distinct phases of team formation and (2) has shown that different mecha-
nisms of team formation can be identified not only in each phase but also be-
tween the two types of new ventures that were founded in different contexts. 
From these qualitative findings, I have derived propositions that might guide 
future research. 
First, although it is increasingly recognized that team formation is a process 
(Cooney 2005; Vanaelst et al. 2006; Ucbasaran et al. 2003) and that the team is 
not a fixed entity throughout the founding process, we still lack a sufficient 
description or model of the different phases of team formation. Most processual 
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models focus on processes inside an existing team (Tuckman and Jensen 1977) 
but not on the formation of the team as such. As for team enlargement, the 
issue has been discussed with respect to its impact on the preexisting team 
(Joy-Matthews and Gladstone 2000), but we similarly lack models of how team 
members join and exit the team. Vyakarnam et al. (1999) also identified two 
phases of team formation and distinguished the “partially formed” and the 
“fully formed” team. While the team fully forms, it becomes more formalized. 
In most of their cases, two “original founders” led this process and became the 
“inner team,” while the added team members were described as “outer team.” 
Although these findings partly correspond with mine, Vyakarnam et al.’s con-
ceptualization of team formation remains fairly unprecise and assumes that a 
team eventually reaches the stage of being fully formed. This goes against the 
notion of team formation as an ongoing process in which team members might 
join but also exit the team (Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Vanaelst et al. 2006). My 
analysis focused on the early founding stages of the new ventures and the for-
mation of the initial team and its enlargement. It is reasonable to assume that, 
in later stages, the team will continue to evolve and team members might leave 
or be exchanged. Thus, there could well be additional phases and different 
mechanisms of team formation in the later stages of new venture creation. 
Clarifying this would require additional research focused on the later founding 
stages. As for the distinction between inner and outer team, my data indicates 
that team members who join later might, but do not necessarily have to, have a 
looser connection with the initial team. The differentiation in an inner and outer 
team seems to appear more likely in those cases in which team enlargement 
was strongly imposed by external pressure.  
Second, I identified different mechanisms of team formation in the two dif-
ferent phases of forming teams. These mechanisms not only varied between the 
phases but also between the two types of new ventures. The nascent entrepre-
neurs of both types were members of different communities (i.e., the entrepre-
neurial or a scientific community) and founded their ventures in distinct sub-
fields of the entrepreneurial field. Previous research has argued that social and 
economic, needs-based selection criteria might not be mutually exclusive 
(Forbes et al. 2006; Aldrich and Kim 2007) but has not yet developed a model 
of how they might be intertwined. My findings suggest that they are temporally 
layered: social selection criteria such as sympathy, familiarity, and homophily 
prevail during initial team formation, whereas needs-based criteria such as 
competences move to the foreground when it comes to team enlargement. 
However, both criteria are present in each of the two phases: out of all possible 
friends, those with the most fitting skill set are chosen; and out of all possible 
people who have the required skills, the most likeable person is chosen. My 
analysis has further shown that certain search mechanisms already imply spe-
cific selection criteria. Most team members are searched for via strong or weak 
social relationships or via bridging ties. Searching within one’s more or less 
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extended personal network increases the likelihood of personal fit (Ruef, Al-
drich, and Carter 2003; Granovetter 1973; Simmel 1908). As recent studies 
have shown, relationships are more important than skill diversity in determin-
ing the effectiveness of new venture teams and should therefore be given more 
attention (Schjoedt et al. 2013). This underscores the idea that team members 
who were friends before (Francis and Sandberg 2000) or have some other prior 
experience with each other (Vyakarnam, Jacobs, and Handelberg 1999) work 
together better. 
If there exists a community that educates nascent entrepreneurs on what is 
expected of them, its blueprints, customs, and routines strongly impact whether 
and what kind of team member is searched for. In light of its educational func-
tion and the shared identity of its members, the entrepreneurial community 
qualifies as community of practice (Wenger 1998). Community of practice is a 
concept from learning theory that emphasizes the importance of professional 
communities in educating newcomers and learning professions. Communities 
of practice are defined as “groups of people informally bound together by 
shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” (Wenger and Snyder 2000). 
Newcomers mostly start as legitimate peripheral observers (Lave and Wenger 
1991). This position crucially involves participation as a way of learning and 
becoming a part of the “culture of practice” (Lave and Wenger 1991). This 
kind of entrepreneurial community plays a crucial role in the start-up part of 
the entrepreneurial field but only a minor role in the spin-off part. In regard to 
the latter, other organizations provide orientation by defining formal require-
ments as to which competences a team must have. Similar to the blueprints of 
the entrepreneurial community, these rules have a homogenizing effect on team 
composition in this type of new venture.  
Following the ideas of new institutionalism, I have argued that, in a com-
munity of practice where nascent entrepreneurs learn blueprints and adapt 
customs, mimetic and normative isomorphism lead to similar team composi-
tions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Where this is missing, formal rules serve as 
a functional equivalent and coercive isomorphism leads to similarities. The 
propositions I have developed suggest that, if team formation is strongly influ-
enced by coercive isomorphism, conflict and an exit of team members might be 
more likely. It might also be less likely that all team members become equal 
members of the team. As Pahnke, Katila, and Eisenhardt showed (2015), the 
institutional logics of the investor affect the output of the new ventures. Similar 
effects can be detected among spin-offs, where the requirements of the public 
funding program influence team formation. Interestingly, in the case of start-
ups, the anticipated expectations of potential partners already impact team 
formation even before they enter a specific relationship with such partners. 
This influence is not mediated through interaction but indirectly through blue-
prints that are communicated in the entrepreneurial community. Thus, field-
level organizations that have influence on such blueprints are likely to shape 
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organizational processes (Lounsbury 2001) – in our case here, the mechanisms 
of team formation – and this impact might even precede a potential relationship 
between the two types of organizations, that is, new ventures and influential 
field-level organizations. The presence and the characteristics of the described 
mechanisms are not static or stable and might change over time. Changes at the 
field level might lead to changes in a variety of organizational processes (Win-
deler and Sydow 2001), for instance, in the mechanisms of team formation. 
Nevertheless, I argue that changes at the field level (e.g., changes in the formal 
requirements of a public funding program) might easily lead to changes in team 
composition and in the decision whether a team member should be added, but 
these changes do not affect how team members are searched for. If the blue-
prints are articulated in a community of practice, then the blueprints might be 
more resistant to change.  
As one of my main arguments is that team formation is strongly influenced 
by the entrepreneurial field, team formation processes might take different 
shapes in different fields, cities, or nations. I analyzed innovative growth com-
panies in a metropolitan area, and the entrepreneurial field showed a very pecu-
liar characteristic: its division into two subfields. Yet it is unclear to what ex-
tent this applies only to Berlin or to other entrepreneurial fields in other regions 
as well. Other fields might feature team formation processes that are more 
similar. Or the field might be equally influential, but different blueprints might 
lead to different mechanisms. The developed framework is a solid starting 
point for comparisons between different fields and opens up an interesting area 
for future research: Which mechanisms can be detected across several fields? 
How do they vary? What is the impact of this variation? My propositions could 
guide that research and serve as a solid groundwork for future testing.  
6.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, my paper not only emphasizes the necessity to pay attention to 
the contexts of team formation but also underscores the need to specify the 
characteristics of each context and their impact. My analysis has shown that 
there are differences in the mechanisms of team formation between the two 
different types of new ventures that were founded in the two different contexts, 
while the new ventures within each type displayed considerable similarities. 
This not only highlights the benefits of a systematic comparison of the two 
types of new ventures from these different contexts but also points to the ne-
cessity to consider the characteristics of the new ventures and their contexts. 
Otherwise, the findings are not comparable. I argue that future research needs a 
more precise and differentiated conceptualization of context, which would 
facilitate a detailed analysis and the comparison of findings. Proposing to con-
ceive of the entrepreneurial context as a field and the entrepreneurial communi-
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ty as a community of practice, and to focus on blueprints, rules, and learned 
customs, as well as the impact of external organizations were steps in that 
direction. 
To increase the comparability of different studies, we also need a shared 
definition of entrepreneurial teams. My analysis shows the benefits of analyz-
ing team formation as a process (Schjoedt et al. 2013; Vyakarnam, Jacobs, and 
Handelberg 1999). Despite the common notion that the team is already com-
plete when the process of venture creation starts, my findings underscore the 
notion that the team evolves and changes during the founding process – a no-
tion that is increasingly gaining traction in research (Ucbasaran et al. 2003; 
Hellerstedt 2009). Team formation is frequently conceptualized as an inten-
tional process (Ruef 2010), often dominated by a lead entrepreneur (Ensley, 
Carland, and Carland 2000). My analysis showed that team formation – and 
initial team formation in particular – is often either a non-intentional process in 
which nascent entrepreneurs come together by accident or one that is triggered 
by a business opportunity. The role of the lead entrepreneur is far more often to 
be found in spin-offs. This emphasizes the necessity to have a closer look at the 
actual form and constellation of teams. Contrary to Cooney’s (2005) call to 
think of entrepreneurship as a collective process, the notion of a lead entrepre-
neur should not be neglected per se. Teams might be composed of team mem-
bers who are on an equal footing, dominated by an initial team, or by one lead 
entrepreneur. Furthermore, new ventures also might be created by a single 
founder (Sydow and Schmidt 2017) as in three of the cases that I excluded 
from my sample. 
If research is interested in how to build a team as successful as possible, the 
restrictive boundary conditions have to be taken into account. To do so requires 
a deeper understanding of how teams form and why this happens in specific 
ways. Forbes et al. (Forbes et al. 2006) characterize the team as a “relatively 
controllable entity” that can be modified to increase venture success. My find-
ings question that idea. By emphasizing the impact of social relations and the 
impact of specific contexts, my analysis shows that team formation is highly 
influenced and restricted by social factors. Teams cannot be composed at whim 
to increase venture success; different team compositions might suit different 
contexts. Adding a team member with managerial skills to spin-offs often does 
not bring the expected success (Clarysse and Moray 2004) and may even de-
crease team efficiency (Vanaelst et al. 2006), as evidenced in some of the cases 
in this study.  
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